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Abstract
This paper presents an experiment performed to test the properties of an inno-
vative bargaining mechanism (called automated negotiation) used to resolve disputes
arising from Internet-based transactions. The main result shows that the settlement
rule tends to chill bargaining as it creates incentives for individuals to misrepresent
their true valuations, which implies that automated negotiation is not able to promote
agreements. However, this perverse eﬀect depends strongly on the conﬂict situation.
When the threat that a disagreement occurs is more credible, the strategic eﬀect is
reduced since defendants are more interested in maximizing the eﬃciency of a set-
tlement than their own expected proﬁt. The implications of these results are then
used to discuss the potential role of public regulation and reputation mechanisms in
Cyberspace.
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By reducing transaction costs, the open structure of the Internet oﬀers businesses and
consumers a new and powerful tool for electronic trade (Shapiro and Varian 1998). For
example, Internet technology lowers buyer search costs by providing them a wider array
of products and services from diﬀerent sellers than they would have in geographically
deﬁned markets. The Internet reduces seller search costs as well, by allowing them to
communicate product information cost eﬀectively to potential buyers, and by oﬀering
sellers new ways to reach buyers through targeted advertising and one-to-one marketing
(Bakos 2001, Garicano and Kaplan 2001). From this point of view, electronic commerce
is widely expected to increase social welfare by intensifying competition and helping the
consumers to enjoy lower prices and more choices.
However, what makes the Internet such an interesting medium for exchange creates
also a number of legal obstacles which could hinder the full economic potential of electronic
commerce from being reaped. The characteristics of the Internet make traditional dispute
resolution through judicial procedures unsatisfactory for many controversies that arise in
electronic commerce (Froomkin 1997). For instance, suppose that a buyer purchases a
product from an auction site and something goes wrong with the sale (e.g., the seller may
ship a damaged item or the item may have been incorrectly described in the auction). Such
a problematic Internet-based transaction raises several issues about how disputes can be
resolved in the virtual environment of electronic markets. First, such a transboundary
transaction creates legal uncertainty about which jurisdiction is competent and about the
applicable law. Second, given that the parties are physically distant, it seems diﬃcult to
haul them into court. Third, the low transaction value may simply discourages the parties
to resort to a costly legal process. Consumers who participate in this type of commerce
expose themselves to a heightened level of risk due to the anonymity and location of the
individual making a sale or purchase.1 During the medieval period, such international
trade was governed by rules of private international law, the lex mercatoria.2 Following
1This uncertainty can explain why buyers lack trust and conﬁdence in online transactions. For example,
62% of the european consumers declare that the lack of legal protection is the main reason for not purchasing
goods online (OCDE 2002). Furthermore, despite the rapid growth in business-to-consumer e-commerce
sales, they still account for a very small share of overall transactions. For example, in United States,
where most Internet transactions take place, business-to-consumer penetration was just 0.48% of retail
sales (Coppel 2000).
2The lex mercatoria (or law merchant) is a body of principles and regulations applied to commercial
transactions and derived from the established customs of merchants and traders rather than the jurispru-
dence of a particular nation or state. The law merchant owed its origin to the fact that the civil law was not
suﬃciently responsive to the growing demands of commerce, as well as the fact that trade in medieval times









































8this idea, many authors have argued that a distinct set of substantive rules should be
created in order to regulate the electronic commerce insofar as the application of legal
rules which focus on the concept of territory is questionable in the case of ubiquitous
computer networks such as the Internet (Johnson and Post 1996).
The need to regulate the electronic commerce has precipitated the creation of several
online dispute resolution companies that oﬀer computer-aided bargaining forums in order
to settle conﬂict situations. These mechanisms consist of proprietary software which uti-
lize the Internet as a means to more eﬃciently engage parties in automated negotiation
of monetary sums. Automated negotiation appears to be an attractive solution to an
important part of the jurisdictional challenges presented by the electronic commerce and
promotes the idea of lex electronica by providing a self-applying settlement tool in which
the legal location and anonymity of the parties do not matter: the resolution is crafted
based on the preferences of the parties and does not require the physical presence of them
(Meﬀord 1997, Rule 2002). In this context, many organizations have called for a variety of
Internet companies to integrate online dispute resolution into their practices. Participants
to the Hague Conference on Private International Law (11-12 December 2000) explored
how online dispute resolution can improve trust for electronic commerce by helping to
resolve business-to-consumer disputes. In the same way, the OECD Guidelines for Con-
sumer Protection in the Context of Electronic Commerce, completed in December 1999,
encourages the use of online dispute resolution.
Let us elaborate the automated negotiation procedure. The resolution process be-
gins when a plaintiﬀ registers with an online dispute resolution service provider, such as
“AllSettle” or “SettleItNow”.3 The provider then uses the information provided by the
plaintiﬀ to contact the defendant party and invite him/her to participate in online dis-
pute resolution. If the other party accepts the invitation, they will then ﬁle a response
to the plaintiﬀ’s complaint.4 From this point, the software accepts sealed oﬀers from the
(Greif et al. 1994, Benson 1996).
3The provider is simply the website delivering the online dispute resolution process. See
http://www.allsettle.com/ and http://www.settleitnow.com/ respectively. For example, “SettleItNow”
is the premier and independent online settlement service developed and supported in Australia.
4The defendant party has a strong incentive to accept the provider’s invitation. Indeed, many of
the online market sites (e.g., eBay, Amazon) have developed reputation management systems that allow
the trading parties to submit a rating of the counterpart’s performance in a speciﬁc transaction (Keser
2003, Cabral and Horta¸ csu 2004, Houser and Wooders 2006). Recent empirical studies of online auction
platforms ﬁnd that such feedback systems have many positive eﬀects in the sense reputable sellers are
more likely to sell their items (Laureti et al. 2002, Resnick and Zeckhauser 2002), and can expect price
premiums (Kalyanam and McIntyre 2001, Lucking-Reiley et al. 2006, Resnick et al. 2006). However,
laboratory evidence shows that reputation systems fail to match the performance of one-on-one long-term









































8parties and determine whether a settlement occurs according to the following bargaining
rule (Gabuthy 2004). Acting independently and without prior communication, plaintiﬀ
and defendant submit price oﬀers bP and bD respectively. If the oﬀers converge or criss-
cross (i.e. bD ≥ bP), then the case is settled and the defendant has to pay the price
asked by the plaintiﬀ: b = bP. If the oﬀers diverge but are within a speciﬁed range (i.e.
bD (1 + δ) ≥ bP > bD), then the settlement price is determined by splitting the diﬀerence
between the parties’ oﬀers: b = (bP + bD)/2.5 Compared to traditional bargaining, it
seems that the automated negotiation procedure would be able to help the disputants to
reach an agreement by providing them an additional possibility to settle their dispute (i.e.
when bD − bP < 0), through an enlargement of the settlement zone proportional to the
compatibility factor, δ ∈ [0,1) (i.e. provided that bD (1 + δ) − bP ≥ 0).
Our main concern is to investigate this issue by evaluating whether automated negoti-
ation is eﬀectively able to generate eﬃciency and help the parties to resolve their conﬂict.
In order to do so, we formulate a simple model of bargaining under incomplete information
that captures many of the important elements of the automated negotiation process, and
then test it by conducting an experiment where we compare the individuals’ behavior to
the derived theoretical predictions. Laboratory experiments serve as a powerful tool for
investigating many kinds of economic phenomena because they provide the means to fully
control the economic environment and simulate the basic assumptions of the model un-
der consideration (Smith 1982). Furthermore, the use of experiments to generate original
data on automated negotiation is necessary for an even practical reason: the conﬁdentiality
which characterizes the online dispute resolution procedures creates important limitations
to get ﬁeld data. The experimental methodology oﬀers the only way to obtain initial data
on automated negotiation and therefore to shed some empirical light on how disputants
respond to the incentives of this innovative settlement mechanism.
In literature, one mechanism that has been proposed to structure two-person bar-
gaining under conditions of two-sided incomplete information is the well-known sealed
bid k-double auction. The sealed bid k-double auction is a one-parameter family of bar-
gaining rules for determining the terms of trade when a single seller and a single buyer
voluntarily negotiate the transfer of an indivisible item. Under this mechanism, buyer
and seller simultaneously choose bids pb and ps, respectively. Trade occurs if and only if
pb ≥ ps; in this case, the buyer pays the seller p = kpb + (1 − k)ps, where k ∈ [0,1]. In
other words, when the compatibility factor is set equal to 0, the automated negotiation
Ockenfels, 2006). See Dellarocas (2005, Table 1, p.3) for a survey of online platforms providing feedback
systems.










































8procedure investigated in our paper reduces to the sealed bid k-double auction mechanism
where k = 0 (i.e. where the seller – or the plaintiﬀ – sets the price unilaterally if an
agreement is reached with the buyer – or the defendant). In order to clearly understand
the analogy between our bargaining situation and the sealed bid k-double auction, it is
helpful to think of the seller (S) as a plaintiﬀ (P) and the buyer (B) as a defendant (D)
who bargain over the price at which the plaintiﬀ which sell his claim to the lawsuit. Start-
ing with the seminal paper of Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983), considerable theoretical
attention has been given to the sealed-bid mechanism (Leininger et al. 1989, Satterthwaite
and Williams 1989, 1993, Brams and Kilgour 1996, Ausubel et al. 2002) and, recently, a
number of authors have experimentally investigated its empirical properties (Daniel et al.
1998, Rapoport et al. 1998, Seale et al. 2001, Parco et al. 2004, Parco 2006 and many
others).6
We depart from these previous studies precisely by focusing the analysis on the role
that the compatibility factor may have on the individuals’ bargaining behavior. Indeed,
our main insightful result shows that, contrary to what may appear to be intuitive on
an a priori basis, an increase in the parameter δ does not enhance the extent to which
agreement is struck. As δ increases, the disputants are discouraged to converge on their
own which induce that the automated negotiation procedure does not signiﬁcantly increase
the range of possible settlements: each party has a strong individual incentive to exploit
strategically the compatibility factor and to adopt aggressive positions, which leads to a
collective ineﬃcient result. The results of the experiment state that the compatibility factor
plagues human interaction and show that the ability of the procedure to generate eﬃciency
increases only when the threat that a disagreement occurs becomes more credible. When
the threat that a disagreement occurs is more credible, the strategic eﬀect due to δ is
reduced since defendants are more interested in maximizing the eﬃciency of a settlement
than their own expected proﬁt.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the game
theoretical analysis of automated negotiation which is based on Gabuthy (2004). Section
3 then describes the experiment designed to examine the strategic behavior of subjects
and presents the theoretical predictions. The results of the experiment are analyzed in
Section 4, and conclusions are drawn with respect to the observed behavior and the factors
contributing to it. The implications of these results are used ﬁnally in Section 5 to discuss
the potential role of public regulation and reputation mechanisms in Cyberspace.
6However, most experimental papers focus the analysis on situations with k = 1/2. Parco (2006) is,
to the best of our knowledge, the only study reporting experimental results with k = 0. For a survey of
earlier papers, see Schotter (1990) and the collection of articles in the book Bargaining with Incomplete










































We consider two players, a defendant and a plaintiﬀ who bargain over the price at which
the plaintiﬀ will sell his claim to the lawsuit. Let vP denote the plaintiﬀ’s reservation price
(i.e. the smallest monetary sum he will accept in exchange for the damage). Similarly,
let vD denote the defendant’s reservation price (i.e. the greatest sum he is willing to pay
for the damage). The valuations of the damage of the defendant and plaintiﬀ are their
private information: each party knows his own reservation price, but is uncertain about
his adversary’s, assessing a subjective probability distribution over the range of possible
values that his opponent might hold. Speciﬁcally, each bargainer i regards the opponent’s





, and these distribution functions are common knowledge. Therefore, the type
spaces are respectively VD = {vD ≤ vD ≤ vD} and VP = {vP ≤ vP ≤ vP}. We focus on
the case of incomplete information essentially because the requirement of the complete
information approach that each bargainer is assumed to know the other’s preferences
and payoﬀs is often regarded as an idealization, incapable of concrete realization.7 The
automated negotiation procedure provides the following bargaining structure.
Acting independently and without prior communication, defendant and plaintiﬀ submit
simultaneous oﬀers bD and bP respectively, deﬁning the action spaces BD = {bD ≥ 0} and
BP = {bP ≥ 0}. The computer software then analyzes these proposals in order to see if
a settlement has been reached. If the oﬀers converge or crisscross (i.e. bD ≥ bP), then
the case is settled and the damage is sold at price b = bP. If they are not, but diﬀer
by less than or equal to δ (i.e. bD (1 + δ) ≥ bP > bD), then the case is also settled
and the damage is sold at price b = (bP + bD)/2, where δ ∈ [0,1) is the compatibility
factor associated with the automated negotiation procedure. In this latter case, the rule
determines the settlement price by splitting the diﬀerence between the players’ oﬀers. If
the oﬀers diﬀer by more than δ, then the agreement is not reached. In this case, there is
no settlement and no money trades hands since each player’s payoﬀ from disagreement is
zero.8 In this context, a main focus of attention concerns the role and impact that δ may
have on the bargaining behavior and the likelihood of a settlement. In order to conduct our
analysis in a simpliﬁed manner and isolate this potential role of the compatibility factor,
7For example, the plaintiﬀ may have more accurate information on the value of the damage, and the
defendant may know whether or not he was negligent.
8While this feature seems to be in the best interest of the defendant, notice that it is a classical
normalization in the literature on bargaining games under incomplete information, which is furthermore
consistent with the actual automated negotiation mechanism: the defendant is not constrained to give any
money to the plaintiﬀ if no agreement is struck in the bargaining process (particularly since the plaintiﬀ









































8Table 1: Players’ payoﬀs
φD φP
if bD ≥ bP vD − bP bP − vP
if bD (1 + δ) ≥ bP > bD vD − (bP + bD)/2 (bP + bD)/2 − vP
if bD (1 + δ) < bP 0 0
Note. For each condition reported in row, the ﬁrst column describes the payoﬀ
earned by the defendant (denoted φD), the second column describes the payoﬀ
earned by the plaintiﬀ (denoted φP).
we deliberately omit from our model various other elements of the settlement mechanism
that would have some role and impact on the issue under study. Especially, some restrictive
assumptions are made in order to develop understanding and intuition about the role of
the forces under study in a sharper manner.
First, we substitute a single-stage bargaining procedure for the multi-stage representa-
tion usually considered in the automated negotiation procedure, in which the disputants
are involved in a ﬁnite sequence of the one-shot game described above. Although this
might be seen as a limitation of the model, such a one-shot framework is arguably rich
enough to generate a wide set of results concerning the equilibrium role of the compat-
ibility factor.9 Through abstracting from the dynamics of the negotiation process, the
single-stage bargaining procedure emphasizes the basic strategy trade-oﬀ faced by each
player: by making a more aggressive oﬀer, a player earns a greater proﬁt in the event of
an agreement but, at the same time, increases the risk of a disagreement, depending on
the value of δ. Second, we assume, without any loss of generality, that there is no direct
cost for the parties from using the automated negotiation service - this is a simplifying
modeling assumption. Currently the automated negotiation providers use a wide range of
fee structures - that is, a submission fee (incurred only by the party requesting the resolu-
tion) and a settlement fee (incurred by both parties if and only if a successful settlement
is reached).
Framing the single-stage bargain as a non-cooperative game, we will characterize the
resulting (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium. In the event of an agreement, each player earns a
proﬁt measured by the diﬀerence between the agreed price and his reservation value (b−vP
for the plaintiﬀ and vD −b for the defendant). In the event of no agreement, each earns a
zero proﬁt. The resulting payoﬀs to both the defendant and the plaintiﬀ are summarized
in Table 1.
9Parco et al. (2004) experimentally investigate the empirical properties of multistage sealed bid k-double









































8We assume that each bargainer makes oﬀers to maximize his expected proﬁt and we
restrict attention to strictly monotonic and diﬀerentiable strategies for the two players. In
this static Bayesian game, a pure strategy for player i is a function bi(vi), where for each
type vi in Vi, bi(vi) speciﬁes the action from the feasible set Bi that type i would choose




Πi = Eφi (i = D,P) (1)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the probability distributions of vi.
Then player i employs a best response strategy if for each vi his oﬀer is a best response
against his opponent’s strategy. In the automated negotiation procedure, disputants face
a complex choice when choosing their oﬀers. Both parties know that while their optimal
independent behavior is to play strategically, they could be better oﬀ by bidding truthfully
(i.e. bD = vD and bP = vP). However, they also know that each bid they place involves
a trade-oﬀ between increasing the odds of a successful trade (accomplished by placing a
bid closer to their reservation value) and increasing their share of the joint gain should
a settlement occur (enhanced by placing a more aggressive bid). The central idea of
the analysis is to investigate how the compatibility factor aﬀects the way individuals
resolve this trade-oﬀ. It would appear at ﬁrst blush that an increase in the value of δ
improves the eﬃciency of the bargaining situation by increasing the settlement zone. In
the case where δ = 0, an agreement occurs only when there is some “bargaining space”
between the two oﬀers (i.e. when bD − bP ≥ 0), while a positive δ provides the parties
a possibility to reach an agreement even when this “bargaining space” does not exist
(i.e. when bD − bP < 0, provided that bD (1 + δ) − bP ≥ 0). The ﬂaw in this line of
reasoning is that it implicitly assumes that the bargaining strategies are unaﬀected by
the changes in compatibility factor. This is not the case, however, since it is easy to
show that changes in the compatibility factor have a drastic eﬀect on the equilibrium
behavior of the parties: ceteris paribus, when δ increases, the defendant becomes more
aggressive by moving away from his reservation value (i.e. by oﬀering a lower price).
Furthermore, automated negotiation induces an asymmetric interaction between players
since the compatibility factor is only assigned to the defendant’s proposal. Under this
bargaining rule, the plaintiﬀ’s strategy is very slightly aﬀected by δ.10
Lemma 1 Under the automated negotiation bargaining rule, the equilibrium oﬀer strate-
10The automated negotiation puts a downward pressure on the plaintiﬀ’s demand only if we consider











































D (vD,δ) = α(δ)vD ; b∗
P (vP,δ) = β (δ)vP + γ (δ)vD
where α(δ) =
2(1 + δ)
(δ2 + 4δ + 2)
, β (δ) =
2(1 + δ)
(2 + δ)




2 (δ2 + 4δ + 2)
.
Proof See the Appendix.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the case where δ = 0 in the automated negotiation
procedure is equivalent to the case where k = 0 in the sealed bid k-double auction mecha-
nism. However, we consider a linear characterization of the equilibrium, which is diﬀerent
from the piece-wise linear representation assumed in Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983).11
As an illustration, consider the special case in which δ = 0 and vP (vD) is uniformly
distributed over the closed interval [0,60] ([40,100]). A straightforward manipulation of
Lemma 1 gives b∗
D(vD) = vD and b∗
P(vP) = 1/2vP + 50 (for all vi, i = D,P), while





vP + 50 for all 0 ≤ vP ≤ 60
vD if 40 ≤ vD < 80
bCS
D =
80 if 80 ≤ vD ≤ 100
The linear characterization has been introduced to simplify the analysis and is consistent
with our experimental data which do not reveal any discontinuity in the individuals’
bargaining behavior.
Following Lemma 1, the compatibility factor has two opposite implications on the
settlement zone, deﬁned by:
bD (1 + δ) ≥ bP (2)
First, by providing the parties an additional possibility to reach an agreement, the
compatibility factor increases the settlement zone for given bargaining strategies: it is
straightforward to show that the compatibility factor has a positive impact on the left-
hand side of (2).
However, at the same time, the compatibility factor leads the defendant to become
more aggressive and move away from his true valuation (while the plaintiﬀ’s demand is
11The multiplicity of equilibria is a well known feature of such games. We diﬀer from Chatterjee and
Samuelson (1983) in the way we get a unique equilibrium.
12These intervals correspond to the low conﬂict situation in our experimental design (see Figure 1,
p.11). The piece-wise linear equilibrium solution of Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) can be derived from
















































δ2 + 2δ + 2

(δ2 + 4δ + 2)
2 vD ≤ 0, since δ > 0 and vD ≥ 0
The defendant’s oﬀer strategy is sensitive to changes in the compatibility factor in a
natural way. In the case where δ = 0, the defendant’s equilibrium proposal coincides with
his reservation value (i.e. bD = vD for all vD). The intuition behind this result is the
following. When an agreement is reached, the case is settled at price b = bP, therefore the
rule is equivalent to granting the plaintiﬀ the right to make a ﬁrst and ﬁnal oﬀer that the
defendant can accept or reject. In this instance, the transaction price is determined solely
by the plaintiﬀ’s demand, while the defendant’s oﬀer serves only to determine whether
there is an agreement or not. The defendant’s dominant strategy is then to make a truthful
oﬀer in order to maximize the probability of settlement. On the contrary, when the
compatibility factor increases the marginal increment in proﬁt associated with a slightly
more aggressive oﬀer becomes weighted more heavily than the possible loss, if as a result of
the change, an agreement is precluded. Concerning the plaintiﬀ’s oﬀer strategy, we could
think intuitively that the defendant’s aggressiveness would force the plaintiﬀ to adopt
a more concessionary bargaining behavior in order to increase the probability to reach
an agreement. This is not the case however because the more compromising party, while
enhancing her chances of reaching an agreement, does so at the expense of lowering her
expected payoﬀ.
Given these two opposite implications, the global eﬀect of the compatibility factor on
the probability that a settlement occurs is not signiﬁcant, except for extreme values of δ
which do not exist in the real automated negotiation procedures. The gain in eﬃciency due
to the increase in the “potential” settlement zone is approximately oﬀset by the eﬃciency
loss due to the parties’ strategic behavior, causing the “actual” settlement zone to be
slightly aﬀected by changes in δ.
Proposition 1 Under the automated negotiation bargaining rule, the compatibility factor
does not improve the eﬃciency of the settlement zone.
The intuition behind this result is the following: the parties are more reluctant to
concede during negotiations because the threat that a disagreement occurs is less credible
for high values of δ. This result is consistent with the predictions of the arbitration models
and the well-known chilling eﬀect (Farber 1981): automated negotiation tends to “chill”
bargaining as it creates incentives for individuals to misrepresent their true valuations and









































8software seems to become a neutral third party who drives the parties’ strategies outside
the range of potential negotiated settlements. This result suggests that the automated
negotiation design is not a good way for increasing the likelihood of a settlement: each
party has a strong individual incentive to exploit strategically the compatibility factor
and adopt aggressive positions, which leads to a collective ineﬃcient result. However,
while this result is theoretically appealing, we have no idea about whether it characterizes
bargaining realities. The next section aims at ﬁlling the gap.
3 Experimental protocol
3.1 Experimental design
We experimentally implement the negotiation game described in Section 2. At the begin-
ning of each period, each subject i is assigned a private reservation value vi (i = D,P).
Then, the defendant and the plaintiﬀ choose simultaneously a bidding price (i.e. bD for
the defendant and bP for the plaintiﬀ). The experiment is based on a factorial 2x2 de-
sign combining two levels of conﬂict (high/low) with two levels of the compatibility factor
(δ = 0 / δ = 30%).
The basic question in our study is whether the compatibility factor aﬀects the bargain-
ing behavior of the parties and under which circumstances does it increase the probability
of reaching an agreement. Therefore, in some of the treatments, participants play under
the conditions of “pure” negotiation in which there is no compatibility factor (i.e. δ = 0)
and the parties may reach an agreement only if their oﬀers are strictly convergent (i.e.
bD ≥ bP). In other treatments, subjects interact under the conditions of automated ne-
gotiation where the compatibility factor equals 30% and the parties have the possibility
to settle their dispute even when bD < bP (provided that 1.3bD ≥ bP, since δ = 0.3).13
However, we can think intuitively that the ability of the automated negotiation mech-
anism to generate eﬃciency (if any) depends on the extent of the conﬂict between the
parties. Therefore, the following treatments are introduced in order to analyze whether
the impact of the compatibility factor depends on the conﬂict situation. In a ﬁrst case, the
private values vD and vP are independently drawn from a uniform distribution with sup-
ports {40,41,...,100} and {0,1,...,60} respectively, while in a second case the respective
uniform distribution sets are {20,21,...,100} and {0,1,...,80}. The last case obviously
characterizes a high conﬂict situation, as illustrated in Figure 1.
Notice that, whatever the conﬂict situation, the plaintiﬀ’s valuation may be equal
13δ = 30% appears to be a reasonable value in order to give the subjects a suﬃcient opportunity to take









































8Figure 1: Conﬂict situations used in the experiment
 
100   40    60  0 
  vD 
  vP 
 
100   20    80  0 
   vD 
vP 
(a) Low conﬂict situation (b) High conﬂict situation
Note. In each Figure, vP denotes the private value of the plaintiﬀ, vD the private value of the defendant. The
bold line illustrates the conﬂict zone settled by the treatment, set either to Low conﬂict (Figure a) or High Conﬂict
(Figure b).
to 0 (since vP = 0), while the defendant’s valuation is strictly positive (since vD > 0).
This assumption may seem to be surprising since we could intuitively consider that the
plaintiﬀ should inherently award a positive value to his claim. However, the assumption
made on the lower bound of the plaintiﬀ’s private value has two motivations. First,
the players’ reservation values may be considered as their disagreement payoﬀs in the
bargaining process. In our analysis, we implicitly assume that i/ there is no cost for the
parties from using the automated negotiation procedure, and ii/ the parties may incur
some diﬃculties to resort to alternative dispute resolution systems if they fail to reach an
agreement during the automated bargaining (due to jurisdictional challenges presented by
such disputes). In other words, the intuition behind the zero value ascribed to vP is that
the plaintiﬀ may have no outside option and gets nothing if no settlement is struck in the
bargaining process. Second, assuming that vP = 0 allows us to extend the settlement zone
(e.g. vD − vP when δ = 0) in order to increase the likelihood of a settlement (for given
bargaining strategies). This way, we avoid that the main result of the paper concerning
the (in)eﬃciency of automated negotiation be due to the incentives given to the plaintiﬀ
in the experimental protocol.
The information provided to the participants maps the information structure of the
game analyzed in Section 2. At the end of each period, each pair of subjects was therefore
privately informed on whether or not they have reached an agreement, about the price
to be paid by the defendant, their own bid, their own payoﬀ in the current period and
their total proﬁt up to this time. As well, payments were determined according to the
automated negotiation rules and the submitted oﬀers. The theoretical predictions for the
experimental game are consequently derived from the background developed above, as
summarized in Table 2.









































8Table 2: Overview of theoretical predictions
δ = 0 δ = 30%
Equilibrium Bidding Strategies
Plaintiﬀ b∗
P (vP)= 0.5vP+50 b∗
P (vP,30%)= 0.49vP+50.49
Defendant b∗









Equilibrium Settlement Zone SZ
∗= vD−0.5vP−50 SZ
∗ (30%)= 1.03vD−0.49vP−50.49
Eﬃcient Settlement Zone SZ
e= vD−vP SZ
e (30%)= 1.3vD−vP
Note. The conﬂict situation is neutral on the formal theoretical predictions. The settlement zone (SZ) is
given by SZ = b∗
D (vD,δ)(1 + δ) − b∗
P (vP,δ), where b∗
D (.) and b∗
P (.) are the players’ equilibrium strategies.
procedure is designed in a particular manner, does the individual’s behavior corresponds
to what the designer intended, and what causes the deviations? Therefore, summarizing
the theoretical predictions, the experimental data are analyzed according to the three
following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1 In equilibrium, when δ = 0:
• The defendant adopts a truth revealing behavior. The equilibrium oﬀer coincides
with his reservation value: b∗
D (vD) = be
D (vD) = vD.
• The plaintiﬀ’s behavior is untruthful, his proposal being higher than his reservation
value: b∗
P (vP) > be
P (vP) = vP.
According to Hypothesis 1, the settlement rule associated with δ = 0 induces a truthful
bidding behavior on the part of the defendant, while the plaintiﬀ’s asking price is biased
upward with respect to his valuation. As a result, even when the defendant values the
damage more highly than the plaintiﬀ, a successful settlement may be impossible: SZ∗ <
SZe.
Hypothesis 2 (Chilling eﬀect) In equilibrium, when δ is increased (set equal to 30%):
• The defendant becomes more aggressive, adopting an under-bidding behavior:
b∗
D (vD,30%) < be
D (vD,30%) = vD
• The plaintiﬀ’s behavior remains the same, over-bidding according to:
b∗
P (vP,30%) > be









































8As stated in Hypothesis 2, only the defendant’s behavior is aﬀected by the rise in the
compatibility factor, moving bidding behavior to more aggressive – untruthful – oﬀers.
Increasing the compatibility factor hence fails to improve eﬃciency: it is still the case
that not all mutually beneﬁcial agreements can be attained via the automated negotiation
procedure: SZ∗ (30%) < SZe (30%). The parties are then discouraged to converge on
their own, resulting in a chilling eﬀect.
Hypothesis 3 When the extent of the conﬂict increases, the settlement zone decreases ;
an agreement is hence less likely.
When the conﬂict situation is high, the distribution sets induce a reduced settlement
zone and do not aﬀect the equilibrium bargaining strategies (for given reservation values).
However, we could think intuitively that this result does not characterize bargaining real-
ities: we conjecture that a higher conﬂict situation should encourage more concessionary
behavior by the parties in order to increase the probability to reach an agreement. In
other words, the disputants should take more reasonable bargaining positions by moving
closer to their true values because the threat that a disagreement occurs is more credible
in a high conﬂict situation. In this context, we believe that this concessionary behavior
could compensate for the perverse eﬀect induced by the compatibility factor. Such a result
would imply that the conﬂict situation alters fundamentally the way the individuals use
the compatibility factor: in a high conﬂict situation, the parties could be incited to use
the compatibility factor more eﬃciently (as a means to increase their chances to reach an
agreement) and less strategically (as a means to increase their payoﬀs).
3.2 Experimental Procedures
In all experimental conditions described above, subjects participated as a defendant or as
a plaintiﬀ in a sealed-bid double auction (one defendant and one plaintiﬀ forming a group).
Role assignment remained the same throughout the entire session. Each pair of partici-
pants had to agree on the exchange price of the claim.14 The experiments were run in the
GATE experimental laboratory with 160 participants over a total of 8 sessions, with each
session comprising 40 periods, hence providing 6400 observations. The participants were
randomly recruited from a subject pool of students of several universities and the graduate
school of management (Lyon). All of them were inexperienced in auction experiments and
no subject participated in more than one of the sessions. In each of the 40 periods, the
14In the experiment, we used a more neutral terminology: a buyer (the defendant) and a seller (the
plaintiﬀ) bargain over the transfer of an indivisible good (the claim). A successful trade is determined by









































8defendant-plaintiﬀ pairs were re-matched such that the same defendant-plaintiﬀ pair did
not interact in two consecutive periods. Therefore, in our setup, all the theoretical results
hold for all periods: since interaction is anonymous and one-shot, the 40 periods are rep-
etitions of static games and not a dynamic game giving rise to further equilibria. In other
words, the random-matching design allow us to minimize (if not completely eliminate)
reputation eﬀects.
Upon arrival, participants were randomly assigned to a speciﬁc computer terminal. In
the beginning of each session, instructions were distributed and read aloud (an English
translation of the original instructions in french as well as raw data are available from the
authors upon request). Clarifying questions were asked and answered privately. Then, we
asked the participants to ﬁll in a control questionnaire in order to check for understand-
ing. Only after all questions had been correctly answered, the experiment started. The
experiment was computerized using the REGATE software (Zeiliger 2000). On average,
each session lasted one hour, excluding payment of subjects. All amounts were given in
ECU (Experimental Currency Unit), with conversion into Euros at a rate of 2 Euros for
100 ECUs upon completion of the session. The total payment was the sum of the single
payoﬀs of the 40 periods plus a 2 Euros show-up fee. Each subject earned on average
slightly more than 14 Euros.
4 Experimental Results
Following the above discussion, our three hypothesis are tested here by assessing the
impact of the compatibility factor and the conﬂict situation on bidding behavior of each
party and the resulting conﬂict resolution implemented by the negotiation procedure.
4.1 Bidding Behavior
We provide a preliminary picture of individual behavior of plaintiﬀs and defendants using
the following indexes:
• Relative deviation from the linear equilibrium strategy – This index (I∗
i ) measures









(i = D,P) (3)
• Relative deviation from eﬃciency – This index (Ie









































8Figure 2: Overview of bidding behavior
(a) Plaintiﬀs (b) Defendants
Legend. + Eﬃciency index (Y axis plotted on the left); • Equilibrium index (Y axis plotted on the right).
Note. Average observed deviation from equilibrium and eﬃciency for plaintiﬀs (Figure a) and defendants
(Figure b) under δ = 0 (upper part) or δ = 30% (bottom part) and under Low (left-hand side Figures for each
party) or High (right-hand side Figures for each party) conlict situation. The indexes are calculated using (3) and
(4).








(i = D,P) (4)
By way of deﬁnition, each index provides a comparison between observed behavior and
either equilibrium or eﬃcient strategies. A positive value of I∗
i indicates that the plaintiﬀ
(defendant) follows a more (less) aggressive pricing strategy than the Nash equilibrium.
Similarly, a positive value of Ie
i reﬂects an over-bidding behavior, the plaintiﬀ (defendant)
asking for a compensation higher (oﬀering more) than his reservation value – a negative
value of each index indicates the other way round.
Figure 2 plots the average indexes across rounds for each party, depending on the
conﬂict situation and the value of the compatibility factor. In line with the results sum-
marized in Table 2, the two indexes mechanically coincides for defendant when δ = 0,
since equilibrium and eﬃcient strategies are the same. An overall salient feature is a slight
learning pattern in the ﬁrst ten periods, suggesting that experience with the mechanism
matters in bidding behavior. This will be addressed in the econometric analysis of the
data.15
15The eﬃciency index sometimes appears to be driven by outliers, dropping to very high values. This
is due to an over-reaction of indexes to deviations associated with very low private values. Just as an
illustration, all 531 individual observations for which the eﬃciency index is above 2 have private values
lower than 21. This upper bound on private values falls to 15 when only those observations for which the









































8We now turn to a discussion of parties’ behavior in line with experimental treatments.
Consider ﬁrst our benchmark situation, namely bidding behavior when the compatibility
factor is set equal to 0. The defendants’ proposals appear to be relatively eﬃcient. Indeed,
the overall average indexes amount to I∗
D = Ie
D = −5% or −6%, depending on the conﬂict
situation. On the opposite, plaintiﬀs’ behavior seems largely ineﬃcient since the price
required is strongly higher than their reservation values (the overall average eﬃciency
index is Ie
P = 73% when the conﬂict is low, 32% when the conﬂict is high). Regarding
comparisons with equilibrium behavior, Parco (2006) states that conferring a price-setting
power to the information advantaged player induces a less aggressive behavior. This seems
to hold as well in our game, characterized by symmetric information conditions. While
defendants choose bids close to equilibrium, plaintiﬀs adopt strategies less aggressive than
those predicted by the Nash equilibrium (the average eﬃciency index is I∗
P = −24% and
−23% under low and high conﬂict situations). As a result, the defendants’ deviation
from equilibrium is signiﬁcantly lower than the plaintiﬀs’ one (Mann-Withney U test and
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, both with p-value: p = 0.0001).
Result 1 When δ = 0, the defendants’ behavior is more truthful revealing than the plain-
tiﬀs’ behavior.
This asymmetric behavior between defendants and plaintiﬀs supports the ﬁrst hypoth-
esis. This makes intuitive sense by referring to the parallel between our double auction
game and the ﬁrst- and second-price sealed-bid auctions in which several purchasers com-
pete to obtain a good.
1. The problem confronting a defendant in automated negotiation (with δ = 0) is
strategically similar to the problem faced by a buyer in a second-price auction. In
second-price auctions, the highest bidder gets the object and pays the second highest
bid. From a theoretical point of view, this procedure is eﬃcient since bidders have a
dominant strategy of bidding up to their private valuation, irrespective of attitudes
toward risk (Vickrey 1961). Indeed, the bid made by the player has no impact on
the transaction price he pays and aﬀects only his probability of winning (which is
maximized by oﬀering the highest price corresponding to his reservation value).16
16However, this behavior is not consistent with laboratory experiments in which subjects are found to
exhibit a consistent pattern of overbidding (Kagel et al. 1987, Kagel and Levin 1993, Harstad 2000).
Economists have very little understanding of why it happens. Recently, Cooper and Fang (2006) provide
an explanation by considering that individuals overbid because they derive positive utility from winning,
over and beyond any monetary payoﬀs. See also Morgan et al. (2003) and Andreoni et al. (2006) for









































8Similarly, in automated negotiation (with δ = 0), the settlement price is determined
solely by the plaintiﬀ’s demand (i.e. b = bP). The settlement rule is therefore
equivalent to granting the plaintiﬀ the right to make a ﬁrst and ﬁnal oﬀer that
the defendant can accept or reject. The defendant’s oﬀer serves only to determine
whether there is an agreement or not. The defendant maximizes the probability to
reach an agreement – conditional on earning positive proﬁts – by bidding an amount
corresponding to his valuation.
2. The problem confronting a plaintiﬀ in automated negotiation (with δ = 0) is strate-
gically similar to the problem faced by a buyer in a ﬁrst-price auction. In ﬁrst-price
auctions, the highest bidder gets the object and pays the amount he bids. The
decision-making in ﬁrst-price auctions is more complex than that in second-price
auctions since each players’ bid involves a trade-oﬀ between increasing the proba-
bility of winning (by placing a bid closer to their reservation value) and increasing
their proﬁt (by placing a more aggressive bid). The experimental literature shows
that buyers underbid compared to eﬃciency (because of this trade-oﬀ) and overbid
compared to the equilibrium (in order to improve their chances of winning). This
standard result is developed in Kagel and Roth (1995).17
Similarly, in automated negotiation (with δ = 0), the plaintiﬀ’s proposal determines
both his proﬁt and the probability of conﬂict resolution. Therefore, he adopts an
ineﬃcient behavior which consists of asking for an amount higher than his reser-
vation value. However, he tends to be less aggressive than predicted by the Nash
equilibrium in order to improve the likelihood of a settlement (as buyers maximize
their probability of winning in ﬁrst-price auctions).
Now turn to bidding behavior under our mechanism of interest (i.e. when a positive
compatibility factor is implemented). Under δ = 30%, remember that when the proposals
do not converge but diﬀer by less than δ, the bargaining rule determines the settlement
price by splitting the diﬀerence between the parties’ oﬀers. Therefore, contrary to the
case where δ = 0, the defendant faces a trade-oﬀ between enhancing the probability to
reach an agreement and increasing his expected payoﬀ. In that sense, the defendants reply
to the change in the compatibility factor in a natural way. As shown in Figure 2, this
settlement rule indeed induces defendants to move away from their valuations and behave
closer to the equilibrium prediction (the average indexes across rounds are Ie
D = −27%
or Ie
D = −14%, and I∗
D = −8% or I∗
D = 8%, depending on the conﬂict situation). The









































8strategic problem faced by the plaintiﬀ is not fundamentally modiﬁed by the split-the-
diﬀerence rule. Whatever the level of δ is, the plaintiﬀ faces a similar trade-oﬀ since the
settlement price corresponds to his own demand (as soon as the oﬀers converge or overlap).
As a result, the compatibility factor does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the plaintiﬀ’s behavior.
When δ = 30%, the plaintiﬀs are therefore still encouraged to adopt ineﬃcient behavior
which is closer to the equilibrium prediction (average indexes amount to Ie
P = 69% or
Ie
P = 48% and I∗
P = −18% or I∗
P = −14%, depending on the conﬂict situation).
The statistical signiﬁcance of the patterns described above are assessed using the fol-
lowing regression. The price oﬀered by a party n at time t, ynt, is speciﬁed as a linear
combination of the covariates, denoted Xnt. This includes our main variables of interest,
namely the level of the compatibility factor, the conﬂict situation and their interaction.
We also account for learning by including a dummy variable set equal to one during the
ﬁrst ten periods only. Last, the reservation value is included jointly with its squared and
cubic values in order to test the linearity of the strategies.18 In this linear speciﬁcation,
ynt = Xntβ +εnt, we account for the panel dimension of our observations by considering a
composed error model: εnt = un + wnt. The individual speciﬁc error term un is assumed
normal in the estimation and captures the distribution of heterogeneity in the population.
The model is separately estimated by maximum likelihood for plaintiﬀs and defendants.
The results are presented in Table 3. First note that the two coeﬃcients on the last dummy
variable strongly suggest that learning occurs during the ﬁrst ten periods. The structural
motives underlying bidding behavior are therefore better estimated by regressions that
include such dummies.
As expected, the proposals of both parties are increasing in their reservation values.
The coeﬃcients on powers of the reservation values moreover support the linearity of the
bidding strategies followed by both plaintiﬀs and defendants. Regarding the impact of the
settlement rule on bidding behavior, the estimated coeﬃcients on the compatibility factor
variable support the asymmetric impact stated in Hypothesis 2.
Result 2 The compatibility factor does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the plaintiﬀs’ behavior,
while defendants become more aggressive by oﬀering lower compensations.
As a result, automated negotiation tends to “chill” bargaining as it creates incentives
for individuals to misrepresent their true valuations and discourage them to converge on
their own. Beyond this overall eﬀect, the coeﬃcient on the interaction variable suggests
18A similar analysis is developed by Radner and Schotter (1989) who show that the behavior of the
subjects is consistent with the linear equilibrium. Notice, however, that their analysis is quite distinct
from ours since they consider symmetric prior distributions and the midpoint trade rule (i.e. k = 1/2).









































8Table 3: Determinants of proposals by plaintiﬀs and defendants
Plaintiﬀ Defendant
Coef. St. Dev. Coef. St. Dev.
Constant 35.60∗∗∗ (1.550) 1.18 (3.459)
Compatibility factor 3.30 (2.023) -14.99∗∗∗ (2.336)
Conﬂict situation -3.57∗ (2.027) -0.34 (2.338)
Interaction 2.97 (2.861) 9.30∗∗∗ (3.303)
Reservation value (vi) 0.38∗∗∗ (0.069) 1.18∗∗∗ (0.168)
v2
i 0.00 (0.002) -0.00 (0.003)
v3
i 0.00 (0.000) 0.00 (0.000)
Learning -2.98∗∗∗ (0.376) -5.20∗∗∗ (0.359)
Log-likelihood -12227 – -12321 –
Legend. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ 10%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗∗∗ 1%.
Note. Random eﬀects OLS regression. The dependent variable is the bid. The
Compatibility factor is treated as a Dummy variable, set equal to 1 if δ = 0.3
; The High conﬂict situation is included as dummy variable ; The Interaction
variable is set equal to one when δ = 0.3 under an high conﬂict situation, 0
otherwise; The Learning variable is equal to one during the ﬁrst ten periods.
The regression is run on 80 individuals (N = 80) observed during 40 periods
(T = 40). Each regression is therefore run on 3200 observations.
that the impact of the compatibility factor is signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the conﬂict situation.
This last variable fundamentally alters the way the defendant uses the compatibility factor:
Result 3 The compatibility factor associated with higher conﬂict situations encourages
defendants to adopt a more concessionary behavior.
The threat of a disagreement becomes more credible in a high conﬂict situation, which
encourages defendants to use the compatibility factor less strategically. In this context, a
higher conﬂict reduces the chilling eﬀect : the defendant uses the automated negotiation
mechanism more eﬃciently in order to increase the probability to reach an agreement –
conditional on positive earnings. The asymmetry between defendants and plaintiﬀs still
remains eﬀective, and the plaintiﬀs’ proposals are not aﬀected by the compatibility factor
in higher conﬂict situations.
Overall, our main variables of interest strongly impact the way the surplus raised by
an agreement is split between parties. More interestingly with regard to eﬃciency, we now
turn to the ability of the settlement rule to promote an agreement between parties.
4.2 Conﬂict Resolution
An overview of the observed conﬂict resolution is provided in Figure 3. For each diﬀerence









































8Figure 3: Average diﬀerences in the bid posted by plaintiﬀs and defendants
Legend. Dash line: δ = 0 ; Solid line δ = 30%.
Note. The ﬁgure plots the average diﬀerence between defendant’s
and plaintiﬀ’s bids (measured as bD − bP) for a given diﬀerence between
private values (measured as vD − vP).
the average diﬀerence between bids (i.e. bD − bP) when the compatibility factor is set
equal to 0 (dash line) or 30% (solid line). A “perfect” conﬂict resolution would imply
that price diﬀerences are positive as soon as the diﬀerence between private values is so.
The observed trend does support an increase in bid diﬀerences in line with the diﬀerence
between private values.
Regarding the impact of the compatibility factor, the ﬁgure illustrates the strategic ex-
ploitation by parties of the settlement rule stressed above. As compared to what happens
when δ = 30%, the defendants’ oﬀers are more often higher than the plaintiﬀs’ demands
when the compatibility factor is set equal to 0 (i.e. the dash line is almost always above
the solid one). The parties therefore seems more reluctant to concede during negotiations
following an increase in the compatibility factor. Under the automated negotiation proce-
dure the occurrence of a “straight” settlement then appears to be less likely, due to parties
being discouraged to converge on their own.
Even though individual behavior is an important determinant of conﬂict resolution,
automated negotiation is precisely aimed at improving the ability of parties to reach an
agreement. Indeed, actual settlements diﬀer from straight ones due to the compatibility









































8Table 4: Settlement rates
Low conﬂict High conﬂict Overall
δ = 0 76.50% (612) 54.25% (434) 65.38% (1046)
δ = 30% 69.25% (554) 57.75% (462) 63.50% (1016)
Overall 72.88% (1166) 56.00% (896) 64.44% (2062)
Note. Each cell provides the proportion of observations that reached
an agreement in the treatment deﬁned by row/column combination.
The corresponding number of observations is provided in parenthesis.
we summarize the actual settlement rates per level of the compatibility factor and con-
ﬂict situation in Table 4. Despite this mechanism, the automated negotiation procedure
appears to fail in promoting eﬃciency. The compatibility factor induces a slight overall
increase in the conﬂict rate, the rate of agreements decreasing from 65.38% when δ = 0
to 63.50% when δ = 30%.
Desegregating those settlement rates as regards to the conﬂict situation, a huge hetero-
geneity however appears. In low conﬂict situations, the chilling eﬀect associated with the
compatibility factor seems to over-compensate for the positive eﬀect of this factor on the
probability to reach an agreement: the settlement rate decreases from 76.5% (when δ = 0)
to 69.25% (when δ = 30%). In higher conﬂict situations, the chilling eﬀect is reduced
since the threat that a disagreement occurs is more credible. This implies that automated
negotiation in this case slightly promotes agreements, as suggested by the increase in the
settlement rate from 54.25% (when δ = 0) to 57.75% (when δ = 30%).
The robustness of those observations is checked using a Probit regression. The ability
to reach an agreement is speciﬁed as a latent variable, denoted y∗
nt, and linked to the








The latent variable is assumed linear in the observables: y∗
nt = Xntβ +εnt , where Xnt
includes the same variables as before, namely: the levels of the compatibility factor and
the conﬂict situation as well as their interaction (dummies), the private values of both the
plaintiﬀ and the defendant. The panel dimension is accounted for by estimating a random
eﬀects model, in which the error term is decomposed into and individual speciﬁc term, a
time-speciﬁc term and an i.i.d. variable: εnt = un + vt + wnt.
As is well known (e.g. Greene 2003, p. 667), the marginal eﬀects of explanatory









































8Table 5: Determinants of conﬂict resolution
Estimation results Marginal eﬀects
Coef. (St. Dev.) Coef. (St. Dev.)
Constant -1.67∗∗∗ (0.118) -0.56∗∗∗ (0.048)
Compatibility factor -0.14 (0.099) -0.05 (0.033)
High conﬂict situation 0.07 (0.087) 0.02 (0.029)
Interaction 0.31∗∗∗ (0.113) 0.10∗∗∗ (0.037)
vP -3.57∗∗∗ (0.120) -1.19∗∗∗ (0.056)




% of predicted observations 83.66%
Legend. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ 10%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗∗∗ 1%.
Note. Probit regression. The dependent variable is a dummy, set equal to one when the
defendant/plaintiﬀ pair has reached an agreement. The Compatibility factor is treated as
a Dummy variable, set equal to 1 if δ = 0.3 ; The High conﬂict situation is included as
dummy variable ; The Interaction variable is set equal to one when δ = 0.3 under an high
conﬂict situation, 0 otherwise; The reservation values of the plaintiﬀ (vP) and defendant
(vD) are included in thousands. 3200 observations are used.
eﬀects are thus provided jointly with estimation results in Table 5. First, remember that
the higher the value placed on the damage by the plaintiﬀ (defendant), the higher the
amount he demands (oﬀers). One should therefore expect an agreement to be less and less
likely as the private value of defendants is decreased and/or the private value of plaintiﬀs
is increased. This rather intuitive pattern is supported by our data, since the coeﬃcients
on private values are both signiﬁcant with the expected sign. Both marginal eﬀects are
moreover close in absolute value, suggesting a symmetric impact of private values on the
likelihood of reaching an agreement.
Regarding the way the settlement rule inﬂuences conﬂict resolution, the estimation
results corroborate the above observations. We summarize them as our last result.
Result 4 The compatibility factor does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the likelihood of a settle-
ment. In higher conﬂict situation, the compatibility factor increases the likelihood of a
settlement.
The ﬁrst part of Result 4 is consistent with Hypothesis 2: despite its purpose, the
compatibility factor does not improve the eﬃciency of the settlement zone. As stressed
before, the reason is the strategic reply of parties to the settlement rule overcomes the









































8eﬀect, an high conﬂict situation however improves the ability of the compatibility factor
to promote conﬂict resolution.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the theoretical properties of the automated negotiation proce-
dure and derive equilibrium strategies for the plaintiﬀ and the defendant. The empirical
properties of this innovative bargaining mechanism are also tested by performing a set of
experiments. In particular, we consider the factors that appear to determine whether a
subject places bids that are close to, or exaggerated from, his reservation value. Following
the experimental results, we can state that the value of the compatibility factor and the
extent of the conﬂict are such factors: the compatibility factor creates a chilling eﬀect
insofar as the settlement rule deliberately splits the diﬀerence between the disputants’
proposals and give them incentives to adopt aggressive bargaining positions, while this
eﬀect is reduced when the extent of the conﬂict is higher.
The intuition behind these results is consistent with a basic ﬁnding of studies on
arbitration which show that arbitration procedures, by lowering the overall cost of dis-
agreement, increases the incidence of disagreement: bargaining with arbitration lessens
the likelihood that bargainers will reach a settlement on their own (Currie and McConnell
1991, Ashenfelter et al. 1992, Dickinson 2004). In other words, despite the signiﬁcant
evidence that arbitrators do not simply split the diﬀerence (Bloom 1986, Farber and Baz-
erman 1986), there does appear to be empirical evidence of a chilling eﬀect to arbitration.19
Another source of evidence is the narcotic eﬀect of arbitration: going to arbitration engen-
ders “dependence” on the procedure (Currie 1989, Bolton and Katok 1998, 2004). More
precisely, a dispute decreases the probability a dispute will happen in subsequent rounds,
however this learning eﬀect with arbitration tends to be lower than it is without.
Furthermore, our experimental results raise the crucial question of how to enforce
agreements reached via automated negotiation and give some elements of thinking about
the potential role of public regulation and reputation mechanisms in Cyberspace. Indeed,
such automated negotiation systems are oﬀered by private companies on the electronic
justice market and are, by deﬁnition, contractual. Therefore, the problem is to know how
a private electronic constraint can ensure that the disputants will enter in this type of
procedure ex ante and will accept not to renegotiate the settlement ex post (given that
nothing other than public justice can force an agent to settle a conﬂict and/or execute a
19Theoretically, Farber (1981) shows that what appears to be splitting the diﬀerence may actually be










































In this context, we could argue that the reputation mechanisms existing on the Inter-
net would be a powerful way to enforce such contracts. As mentioned in the Introduction,
many of the online market sites (e.g. eBay, Amazon) oﬀer reputation management sys-
tems that allow the trading parties to submit a rating of the counterpart’s performance.
Therefore, we could conjecture that if one of the disputants does not respect the settle-
ment stated by the automated algorithm, then a naming and shaming strategy would
occur and allow to enforce it. Furthermore, the question concerning the acceptance (or
not) of the settlement by the parties arises obviously only if the latter managed to reach
an agreement during the automated negotiation process. In other words, what happens if
no agreement is reached at the end of the negotiation? This question is not trivial given
the poor economic performance of the mechanism and we could think intuitively that the
parties will recourse to an alternative dispute resolution system, such as arbitration or
mediation (which are also available online).
In summary, this paper may be considered as a ﬁrst step in the empirical investigation
of online dispute resolution. Indeed, following the above arguments, it is obvious that
further experiments will have to be done before a clear picture of how the type of mecha-
nisms studied here perform well. Such experiments would take into account, for example,
the impact of reputation and the role of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. In
this context, we feel conﬁdent that the types of question raised by our experiment will be
central to the ﬁnal unraveling of the puzzles presented by the computer-aided bargaining
systems available in the online environment.
Appendix: Proof of Lemma 1
Considering linear strategies, we assume that the defendant’s strategy is bD (vD) = aD +
cDvD and the plaintiﬀ’s one is bP (vP) = aP +cPvP. Then bD is uniformly distributed on
[aD + cDvD,aD + cDvD] and bP is uniformly distributed on [aP + cPvP,aP + cPvP].
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8The ﬁrst-order conditions for which yield
bD =
2(1 + δ)
δ2 + 4δ + 2







2 (aD + cDvD) (5)
Given the linear strategies bD (vD) = aD+cDvD and bP (vP) = aP+cPvP, by manipulating













2 (δ2 + 4δ + 2)
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